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Public Finance Review
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Matching Grants and Public Goods: a Closed-Ended Contingent Valuation Experiment

J. Paul Combs

Appalachian State University

Rickey C. Kirkpatrick

Appalachian State University

Jason F. Shogren

Iowa State University

Joseph A. Herriges

Iowa State University

Matching grants are commonly used to influence the bundle of public goods provided by governments. A contingent valuation experiment was designed to determine the value that individuals place on improved recreational facilities under a matching grant proposal. The experiment provided an opportunity to examine preferences given the public good exists in an active and well-defined market, and the valuation experiment was perceived as meaningful to public policy. The researchers estimated a mean willingness-to-pay for park improvements of $8.30, far less than the implied tax increase of $21 provided by local politicians opposed to the project but nearly double the actual tax increase for the average property owner.

Public Finance Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, 178-195 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/109114219302100204
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