Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

CiteULike is a free service for managing and discovering scholarly references - click here to get started.

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Public Finance Review
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Formby, J. P.
Right arrow Articles by Smith, W. J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Tax Neutrality and Social Welfare in a Comptutational General Equilibrium Framework

John P. Formby

University of Alabama

Steven G. Medema

University of Colorado at Denver

W. James Smith

University of Colorado at Denver

This article investigates the effects of distributionally neutral tax changes on equity and efficiency using computational general equilibrium and stochastic dominance techniques. The authors find, for a tax increase, that the constant-tax-share definition is preferred both in terms of efficiency and equity for a wide range of values of the elasticity of labor supply. For a tax decrease, the constant-after-tax-income definition dominates. For low elasticities of labor supply, no general welfare conclusions can be drawn, but under reasonable assumptions the constant-tax-share definition would be approved by a risk-averse median voter.

Public Finance Review, Vol. 23, No. 4, 419-447 (1995)
DOI: 10.1177/109114219502300401
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?