This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Sutter, D. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Durable Constitutional Rules and Rent Seeking

University of Oklahoma

Many constitutional political economists argue that the length of time constitutions remain in effect distinguishes constitutional politics from legislative politics. The author explores the role of constitutional durability in a repeated rent-seeking game. A general interest (e.g., consumers) in the game can lobby for a constitutional prohibition that prevents the rent-seeking contest from occurring. A durable constitution can reduce expected rent-seeking expenditures if constitutional politics occurs less frequently than legislative politics, stable rights to receive rents do not exist, and the general interest has a longer time horizon than rent seekers. Under these conditions, general interest lobbying for a constitutional prohibition denies transfers to future rent seekers unable to participate in politics today.

Key Words: Rent seeking • constitutional political economy • rent dissipation

Public Finance Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, 413-428 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/1091142103031004004


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?