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Horizontal and Vertical Tax Competition in Florida Local Governments

University of Illinois at Chicago, yonghong{at}uic.edu

Rebecca Hendrick

University of Illinois at Chicago

This is an empirical exploration of tax competition among Florida local governments. We estimate a spatial lag reaction function for property tax rate of Florida municipal governments in 2000 and 2004. The level of ``neighborliness'' is measured as spatial distance between geographical centers of municipalities. The weight matrix excludes the municipalities locating within the same county to eliminate their common responses to higher-tier government property tax policy. By including the property tax rate levied by other local governments (counties, school districts), we find that tax competition exists for property tax among neighboring municipalities (horizontal) as well as between municipalities and other local governments (vertical). The response of municipal governments is negative to county's property tax rate but positive to school district's property tax rate.

Key Words: local governments • property taxation • tax competition • vertical tax externalities

This version was published on May 1, 2009

Public Finance Review, Vol. 37, No. 3, 289-311 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1091142109332054


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